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PROFESSOR ZEPHYR TEACHOUT 
Seth Barrett Tillman*  
I. THE DEBATE SO FAR 
In her 2009 Cornell Law Review article, The Anti-Corruption 
Principle,
1
 and in subsequent publications (including here on Northwestern 
University Law Review Colloquy
2
), Professor Teachout thoroughly analyzed 
the text of the Constitution and the records of its framing, primarily relying 
upon three clauses
3
: the Ineligibility Clause, the Incompatibility Clause, and 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
4
 This last clause, the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, proscribes (at least some) United States officials from accepting 
gifts from foreign governments absent congressional consent. Teachout’s 
key insight was to analogize corporate contributions and spending in 
domestic elections to these proscribed foreign government gifts. Like 
foreign governments, domestic corporations do not owe a duty of loyalty to 
the United States. A domestic corporation’s duty of loyalty is owed to its 
stockholders, not to our polity as a whole. On the strength of this analogy, 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause enjoyed pride of place in her analysis; or, 
at least, that is the way her paper was commonly understood.
5
 Teachout 
observes that the purpose, if not the primary purpose, behind these three 
provisions (and that of many other constitutional provisions) was to prevent 
or limit corruption. On this basis, she suggests that the Constitution 
embodies a structural anti-corruption principle. At this very generic level of 
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  Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009) (link). 
2
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4
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5
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But then we turn to brass tacks, including the scope of the 
Constitution’s anti-corruption principle: here Teachout and I disagree. 
Teachout’s position is that because election-related “corruption” connected 
to corporate campaign contributions and spending was unknown to the 
Framers and their era, it would be unreasonable to expect the Framers’ text 
to deal with this specific type of corruption. Thus it is no surprise that 
Congress lacks an express Article I power over election-related 
contributions and spending, corporate or otherwise. After all, “it is a 
constitution we are expounding,”
6
 not a prolix document dealing with cases 
and situations wholly unknown and unforeseen by those who created it. So 
recognizing that the text of the Constitution is a somewhat incomplete 
agreement, Teachout turns to higher level principles. She argues that 
because the primary purpose of many constitutional provisions was to 
prevent corruption, the Constitution implicitly permits Congress to enact 
legislation regulating federal (and, perhaps, state) corporate campaign 
contributions and spending. In so doing, we moderns would be furthering 
the Framers’ eighteenth-century purposes. 
 There are three primary reasons why Teachout’s interpretive strategy 
does not work. First, Teachout misstates the scope of the constitutional 
provisions on which her analysis relies. Some of these provisions use Office 
language in any of several cognate forms. The particular Office language 
used varies from constitutional provision to provision. Other provisions 
refer expressly to elected federal officials, with the precise scope of each 
clause—what office or offices the clause applies to—varying from clause to 
clause. In her Cornell Law Review article, Teachout implied that the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause’s proscription against foreign government gift-
giving and its Office . . . under the United States language, reaches all 
elected federal officials. Here, on Northwestern University Law Review 
Colloquy, she has defended that interpretation; indeed, she has expanded on 
it by expressly arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office . . . 
under the United States language reaches both elected federal positions, 
including members of Congress, and also elected state officials. Teachout’s 
position is sui generis. The prevailing view is that the Constitution 
embraces a global officer–member distinction. So Teachout’s position has 
profound implications for both the Foreign Emoluments Clause (and 
Teachout’s anti-corruption principle) and for every other constitutional 
provision using Office language.  
I believe Teachout is wrong about the scope of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause and its Office . . . under the United States language. As 
I will explain, my position is that Office . . . under the United States reaches 
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constitutionally created positions. If my analysis is correct, then the force of 
Teachout’s key analogy falls. If, as I have argued, the Framers extended the 
proscription against foreign government gift giving to appointed officers 
and chose language which did not reach elected officials (although such 
language was readily at hand), then the scope of Teachout’s anti-corruption 
principle—to the extent it is reliant on the Foreign Emoluments Clause—
would be similarly limited.  
Second, the varying Office language throughout the Constitution poses 
other difficulties for Teachout’s analysis. Let us imagine the Constitution 
had thirty provisions directed against “corruption.” If each of the thirty 
provisions used language reaching all elected federal officials, then we 
might have reason to conclude that the Constitution embraced a nontextual 
or implicit structural anti-corruption principle. And if in the fullness of time 
a form of corruption came about which was unknown to the Framers, then 
even if such a form of corruption was not squarely addressed by any 
express constitutional provision, we might have reason to conclude that the 
Framers’ anti-corruption principle would function like an express Article I 
enumerated power. Moreover, the scope of that power would permit 
congressional regulation in regard to every elected federal office. Why? 
Because each constitutional provision which gave rise to the anti-corruption 
principle reached every elected official.  
Now, let us again imagine the Constitution had thirty provisions 
directed against “corruption.” Five provisions relate to House members; 
five provisions relate to Senate members; five provisions relate to the 
presidency (and vice presidency). A further five provisions relate to the 
House and Senate; five more relate to the Senate and President; the last five 
relate to federal electors and state elected officials commanding federal 
powers. Here the situation is more complex. In these circumstances, if in 
the fullness of time we discover a form of corruption unknown to the 
Framers, although we might agree that the Framers were against corruption 
as an abstract matter, and although we might agree that the Constitution 
embraces some sort of nontextual or implicit anti-corruption principle, we 
have no clear way to identify the precise scope of that principle. To whom 
or what institutions would it apply? Representatives, senators, the President, 
the Vice President?  
Our Constitution is much more like the one described in the latter 
hypothetical, as opposed to the former. Indeed, even when referring to 
Officers, the Constitution embraces much diverse language. So the precise 
scope of the anti-corruption principle—in the context of corporate 
campaign contributions and spending—is something Teachout has to 
explain and defend. She cannot argue that every provision of the actual 
Constitution covers every elected official. She could turn to the best 
analogical clause, but that would be the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which 
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does not refer to any elected officials. So what is left? She could take a 
center-of-gravity approach: most of the most important anti-corruption 
provisions embrace most elected officials, at least, in most circumstances. 
Such an approach would face many difficult conceptual problems; it would 
require the interpreters’ weighing or summing lawmakers’ original intent or 
purposes across multiple constitutional provisions. Teachout never gives us 
an analysis along these lines. And this is not surprising. The final language 
of most (if not all) of the Constitution’s anti-corruption provisions was the 
product of debate and compromise. Indeed, the varying Office language 
across constitutional provisions is itself some indication that the Framers 
actively considered the scope of these provisions. Why vary the language 
unless one intended to vary the scope?
7
 In other words, preventing or 
limiting corruption was a goal of the Framers, but it competed with other 
principles and policy goals. With regard to each anti-corruption provision, 
different compromises were struck and different offices and positions were 
encompassed by the scope of each clause. That poses a substantial problem 
for Teachout’s analysis. Teachout can argue that the Framers would have 
addressed, in some fashion, this issue had they experienced the form of 
corruption that interests us here: corporate campaign contributions and 
expenditures. But given that minimizing corruption competed with other 
principles and policy goals, it is difficult to see how Teachout could predict 
what compromise the Framers would have struck had they considered a 
problem with which they had no experience. If there is no neutral way to 
translate the anti-corruption principle into our modern context and at the 
same time to translate the other principles and policy goals with which it 
competed, then we are adrift without compass, map, or star to guide us. All 
we have is an abstract anti-corruption principle, but we have no way to 
determine if it encompassed or should encompass any particular (much less 





  Indeed, in regard to some anti-corruption provisions, the Framers had language from the Articles 
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Finally, Teachout argues that the anti-corruption principle is akin to 
separation of powers or federalism principles, long embraced by the courts 
and the public. She argues that the anti-corruption principle does not rise or 
fall with any one or more clauses because the anti-corruption principle 
inheres in the Constitution’s structure itself. Even if this is correct, this 
position suffers from the same defects as the ones described above. 
Analogizing the anti-corruption principle to separation of powers or 
federalism only tells us that the anti-corruption principle exists, but it does 
not tell us the scope of the principle: does it reach elected federal and state 
officials, all or none, or some, and if some, which? Such analogies (at most) 
teach us that it is permissible to discover atextual interpretive principles in 
the Constitution, but such interpretive strategies do not furnish us with any 
guidance as to the scope of the anti-corruption principle itself. More 
importantly, unlike federalism, the argument for the existence of the anti-
corruption principle flows from the individual clauses which Teachout has 
so meticulously collected, catalogued, and described. If the scope of those 
clauses is not consistently uniform, how can we divine the scope of the anti-
corruption principle in the modern context of corporate campaign 
contributions and spending? And if we cannot, then Teachout’s anti-
corruption principle cannot contribute to our First Amendment or election 
law jurisprudence.  
Again, Teachout and I agree that the Constitution’s text embraces an 
anti-corruption principle of constitutional dimension. We disagree in regard 
to its scope. I believe the scope of that principle extends only to appointed 
federal officers; Teachout believes it reaches elected officials. Indeed, last 
spring on Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Teachout put 
forward a maximalist defense of her position on all fronts.
8
 Interestingly, 
Teachout’s arguments for her maximalist position are largely clause-bound; 
she offers no intratextual or global assessment for her position. Teachout 
argues that the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office . . . under the United 
States language encompasses federal and state elected positions, but she 
never discusses how this understanding of constitutional text would 
destabilize our understanding of the many coordinate constitutional 
provisions making use of the same or similar Office language. In this sense, 
Teachout’s position remains woefully undertheorized. Still I am not 
surprised that Teachout takes this clause-bound approach. If Teachout is 
correct (even in regard to elected federal officials), if the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause’s Office language reaches elected officials, then 
identifying the scope of the anti-corruption principle would no longer be 
particularly problematic. Her powerful analogy between domestic 
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grounds, and the scope of the anti-corruption principle would be readily 
determinable. And that is why—despite some protestations to the contrary 
on her part—her defense of her position and this debate remain largely 
about the constitutional text and history, to which I now turn.  
II. THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE AND ELECTED FEDERAL 
OFFICIALS 
 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: 
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under 
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of 
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind 




The Foreign Emoluments Clause and other anti-corruption provisions 
in the Constitution’s text make use of the phrase Office . . . under the 
United States or other similar language. In her 2009 Cornell Law 
Review article, Teachout implied that state and federal elected offices are 
encompassed by this language. But she did not demonstrate why this must 
be true. This Office . . . under the United States language appears in the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause as well as in the Constitution’s other primary 
anti-corruption provisions.
10
 I have argued that the scope of this 
terminology does not reach state or federal elected officials. If I am correct 
that Office . . . under the United States extends only to those holding 
federal appointed or statutory offices, then her analogy cannot smuggle 
any elected officials back into the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
or the other primary anti-corruption provisions. 
Why? Even if the Framers were unfamiliar with the contours of the 
modern corporate form, the Framers did know what elected “offices” were 
and they knew exactly what corruption was—after all, Teachout’s whole 
point is that the world of 1787 was corruption-“obsessed”
11
 and the primary 
“offices” at issue here were created by the Framers themselves. In other 
words, if the core purpose of the Foreign Emoluments Clause was to ensure 
the loyalty of those holding federal appointed or statutory offices, then even 
if corporate election contributions and spending are akin to gifts from 
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provide the constitutional or textual hook Teachout so desperately needs.
12
 
If (federal and state) elected officials are not Officers . . . under the United 
States, the Foreign Emoluments Clause cannot provide a textual foundation 
to uphold statutes regulating political activity directed at elections and 
election-related conduct. It is that simple.  
Last spring, in her 2012 Northwestern University Law Review 
Colloquy essay, Teachout argued in express terms what she only had 
implied in her 2009 Cornell Law Review article. In the remainder of this 
Essay, I will elaborate why I do not find her arguments and evidence 
convincing on the merits: why (notwithstanding her objections) I 
believe Office . . . under the United States extends only to appointed or 
statutory federal officers.  
In assessing which position is better supported by the evidence, 
Teachout’s position or mine, I frankly admit that there is some evidence on 
her side. I do not deny that she has met her burden of production. My goal, 
then, is to show that, all things considered, my view is better supported by 
the totality of the most relevant textual and historical evidence: evidence 
that was roughly contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution. 
It is not clear to me if this is Teachout’s methodological position. It appears 
to me that Teachout believes if her anti-corruption principle is supported by 
any credible evidence, even if it is not the better (or best reading) of the 
totality of the most relevant evidence, then the anti-corruption principle 
becomes a legitimate interpretive vehicle, structural principle, or canon of 
construction, etc. As a normative matter, this position seems wrong. The 
fact that a position is historically conceivable or grammatically possible 
does not make it a probable or likely
13
 public understanding of disputed 
constitutional text. And, it certainly does not make it the better (or best) 
understanding of that text. It would seem to me that that is our goal.  
A. The Hamilton List 
In 1792, during George Washington’s first administration, Secretary of 
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton was directed by the Senate of the Second 
Congress to produce a list of “every person holding any civil office or 
employment under the United States, (except the judges) . . . .”
14





  Teachout’s analogy might have some force where corporate political activity is directed towards 
influencing a person holding a federal appointed or statutory office. Still, for a strict textualist, 
Teachout’s argument is a non-starter. Generally speaking, domestic corporations are not “foreign 
States,” and as such, any Foreign Emoluments Clause-based argument simply fails at the outset.  
13
  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3072 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most 
likely public understanding of a particular provision at the time it was adopted.” (emphasis added)) 
(link).  
14
  1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 441 (Washington, Gales & 
Seaton 1820) (May 7, 1792 entry) (emphasis added). 
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some; any not some. Nine months later, Hamilton returned a ninety-page 
document that included all those holding federal appointed or statutory 
office in every branch, but no elected officials in any branch.
15
 Not 
surprisingly, no state officials were included. These events are roughly 
contemporaneous with the enactment of the Constitution and involved an 
actor who played a prominent role in drafting and ratifying it. Hamilton’s 
response was an official communication from the Treasury to the Senate: 
his actions here represent an official Executive Branch construction of 
(what is now) contested language.  
Teachout has responded with several arguments. Her first theory—that 
the salaries of the President and Vice President were widely known and 
therefore not deemed to be necessary to include in the report—simply does 
not cohere with the known facts.
16
 Yes, the President’s and Vice President’s 
annual salaries were known. They were both set by statute during the First 
Congress. But congressional statutes from the First Congress also set the 
salaries for cabinet officials.
17
 Those cabinet salaries were also known. Yet 
Hamilton included cabinet members’ salaries, but not the President’s and 
Vice President’s salaries. As for Representatives and Senators, they were 
paid a per diem, not an annual salary. Their salary—in the sense of what 
was actually paid—was not well-known. The only way to know what they 
were paid was to research it and report it. Yet Hamilton omitted reporting 
any such information—even though he did report what Senate and House 
administrative officers were paid.  
Teachout’s argument that the phrase “office under the United States” 
may have been ambiguous also does not help her cause. If the phrase was 
reasonably subject to different understandings, then Hamilton should have 
included close cases. After all, functionally speaking, the document’s 
intended purpose was to aid congressional oversight and budgeting. Thus, if 
there were some doubt or ambiguity whether federal elected positions 
were Offices . . . under the United States, such positions should have been 
included, but they were not. Teachout could retreat by suggesting that the 
phrase was ambiguous, but the ambiguity—although known to her—was 





  The list included: all cabinet members and other appointed Executive Branch officers, but not the 
President or Vice President; clerks of the federal courts, but not the judges (which Hamilton was 
expressly asked to omit); the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary’s staff, the Clerk of the House 
and the Clerk’s staff, but not the members of the Senate or House or the presiding officers. See Seth 
Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 14–15 (2012), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
colloquy/2012/7/LRColl2012n7Tillman.pdf, reprinted in 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399 (link). 
16
  See Teachout, supra note 2, at 41. 
17
  See Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 19, § 1, 1 Stat. 72 (setting the President’s and Vice President’s 
compensation); Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 67, 67–68 (setting salaries for the Cabinet and 
others).  
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scope of the phrase. Such a linguistically specific defense requires some 
evidence illustrating Hamilton’s limited grasp of what appears to be 
common words and a phrase repeatedly appearing in the Constitution itself. 
Teachout offers no such defense. Moreover, even if she is right and this 
ambiguity existed but was unknown to Hamilton, why precisely does 
Teachout believe her preferred meaning is better than Hamilton’s (except 
that it accommodates a maximalist view of her anti-corruption principle)?  
Each of the two remaining arguments Teachout puts forward in her 
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy essay—that there were 
other prudential or political reasons that Hamilton did not include those 
salaries or that the context in which the question was asked led Hamilton to 
think that it was not intended to cover the President or Vice President—is 
conceivable. But, the fact that a position is conceivable does not make it 
likely. To shift from the conceivable to the probable, from the possible to 
the likely requires evidence. Teachout puts forward none.  
B. George Washington’s French Gifts 
While President, George Washington received two gifts from foreign 
government functionaries: Lafayette gave Washington the key to the 
Bastille,
18
 and the French ambassador gave Washington a picture frame and 
full-length portrait of Louis XVI.
19
 Washington accepted and kept both 
without asking for or receiving congressional consent.
20
 The public knew 
about the gift of the key: it was widely reported.
21
 Many must have known 
about the gift of the portrait: it was on display in Washington’s anteroom, 
beyond which he entertained official visitors.
22





  See ANDRÉ MAUROIS, ADRIENNE: THE LIFE OF THE MARQUISE DE LA FAYETTE 160 (Gerard 
Hopkins trans., 1961) (noting Lafayette’s 1789 appointment as Vice President of the National 
Assembly); id. at 162–63 (noting Lafayette’s 1789 appointment (by the King) and subsequent election 
(by the Paris electorate) as commander of the National Guard, formerly known as the bourgeois militia); 
THE LETTERS OF LAFAYETTE TO WASHINGTON 1777–1799, at 347–48 (Louis Gottschalk ed., 1976) 
(reproducing March 17, 1790 letter from Lafayette to Washington giving the key to the Bastille). 
19
  See Letter from Ambassador Ternant to George Washington (Dec. 22, 1791), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 306, 306 n.1 (Mark A. Mastromarino & Jack D. Warren, Jr. eds., 2000).  
20
  See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1589 (1798) (statement of Rep. Williamson) (reporting May 4, 1798 
debate—more than a year after Washington left office—as the first congressional debate on the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause) (link); id. at 1582 (statement of Rep. McDowell) (noting that this was a “new 
subject” for Congress) (link).  
21
  See, e.g., Philadelphia, 12 August, FED. GAZETTE & PHILA. DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 12, 1790, 
at 2 (“Last week the key of the Bastille, accompanied with a fine drawing of that famous building, was 
presented to the President of the United States, by John Rutledge, jun. Esq. to whose care they were 
committed by the illustrious patriot the Marquis de la Fayette . . . .”); New-York, August 10, PA. PACKET, 
& DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 13, 1790, at 2 (same); see also STEPHEN DECATUR, JR., PRIVATE AFFAIRS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 144 (1933) (noting that key was on display in a public levee).  
22
  See, e.g., Letter from Edward Thornton to James Burges (Mar. 5, 1793), in S.W. Jackman, Notes 
and Documents, A Young Englishman Reports of the New Nation: Edward Thornton to James Bland 
Burges, 1791–1793, 18 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 85, 121 (1961) (writing from Philadelphia: “I don’t 
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the King’s initials appeared above Washington’s family crest and 
Washington’s initials!
23
 This is extraordinary probative evidence in regard 
to establishing the original public meaning of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause.
24
   
Teachout responds by proposing multiple explanations for President 
Washington’s conduct, suggesting alternatively that Washington did not 
wish to subject himself to Congress’s oversight and actively chose to evade 
the rule; that Washington’s diplomatic role for the young nation prevented 
his refusal; that the portrait was not a “present” under then-current 
diplomatic conventions; that Washington believed the portrait was a 
personal rather than official gift; that Washington uniquely could ignore the 
Constitution where others could not; and that the value of the portrait was 
de minimis.
25
 Finally, Teachout suggests: “I am not willing to take a strong 
stand on what Washington was thinking when he accepted the print, but it 
strikes me as entirely plausible that Washington acted without consideration 




Not one of Teachout’s alternative theories carries any indicia of 
support. Some of these theories are evidence-reliant, such as her claim that 
portraits were different, i.e., not encompassed by the public domestic 
                                                                                                                           
know whether I mentioned to you formerly that the key of the Bastil[l]e, given to a certain Great Man 
here by La Fayette is hung up in a glass frame in the principal room of the Great Man’s house with an 
engraving of Louis XVI . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
23
  William B. Adair, A Masterpiece of Artisanship, PICTURE FRAMING MAGAZINE, Aug. 2010, at 28 
(describing the print and frame as “an official diplomatic gift”).  
24
  Evidence arising in connection with the Washington administration is generally considered 
superior to that of later administrations. First, Washington’s administration was contemporaneous with 
the Constitution’s ratification. Second, the President was a Framer and his cabinet contained other 
Framers and ratifiers. Third, the President saw himself above party or faction; indeed, active partisan 
federal electoral politics did not arise until after Washington decided not to run for a third term. Fourth, 
Washington understood that his personal and his administration’s conduct were precedent-setting even 
in regard to what might appear to be minor events and conduct. Fifth, Washington both valued his 
reputation for probity and acted under the assumption that his conduct was closely monitored by 
political opponents and opportunists. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington 
(July 27, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 366 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) 
(“You cannot doubt my wishes to see you appointed to any office of honor or emolument in the new 
government . . . . My political conduct in nominations . . . must be exceedingly circumspect and proof 
against just criticism, for the Eyes of Argus are upon me, and no slip will pass unnoticed that can be 
improved into a supposed partiality for friends or relatives.”). Finally, at the time the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause was drafted, this internal corruption motivation “was largely not a jingoistic fear—
the United States was too young, in part, but the countries that threatened were countries that many of 
the Framers had strong and direct ties to, even affection for—France, most prominently.” Teachout, 
supra note 1, at 361. 
25
  See Teachout, supra note 2, 41–42 (footnote to Tillman omitted).  
26
  Id. at 42. But see Robert Ralph Davis, Jr., Diplomatic Gifts and Emoluments: The Early National 
Experience, 32 HISTORIAN 376, 389–90 (1970) (noting that in 1790, Jefferson consulted Washington in 
regard to setting policy involving American gifts for foreign diplomats).  
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meaning of “present” or, perhaps, not considered “presents” under 
customary international law. No evidence is put forward for this or her 
other views.  
All her remaining theories to account for Washington’s conduct all go 
to Washington’s subjective motivation. Teachout’s analysis errs here. No 
one should be interested in Washington’s motivation as a thing in itself. 
One is only interested in Washington’s conduct as evidence of public 
meaning. The question is not (merely) why Washington did what he did, 
but why Teachout is unable to point to any evidence in Congress, or the 
press, or even private letters complaining in regard to Washington’s 
conduct.  
There is a better, simpler view that accounts for the evidence we have 
without relying on evidence we have yet to discover. Washington did 
nothing wrong within the confines of the Constitution as it was understood 
in 1790 (when he accepted the key), or 1791 (when he accepted the 
ambassador’s frame and print), or 1792 (when the Senate directed Hamilton 
to produce his list). We lack records voicing complaint in regard to 
Washington’s conduct because the public had no basis to object to his 
conduct. Teachout is unwilling to take “a stand on what Washington was 
thinking.” That’s good—because she does not have to.  
C. Teachout’s Precedents 
Teachout relies upon post-Washington era materials, including state 
materials, without explaining why this evidence is more persuasive than the 
Washington-era evidence.  
Executive Branch Practice. Teachout correctly cites post-Washington 
Executive Branch practice where presidents, such as Van Buren and Tyler 
in the 1830s and 1840s, sought congressional consent upon receipt of gifts 
from foreign governments.
27
 Likewise, Andrew Jackson received a gold 
medal from the South American revolutionary Simón Bolívar, President of 
Columbia. In 1830, Jackson submitted it to congressional control.
28
  
Nowhere does Teachout put forward any principled argument for 
believing that the Jackson–Tyler-era precedents better comport with 
original public meaning than the Washington–Hamilton-era precedents.  
State Case Law. Teachout also turns to a variety of cases arising in 
state courts involving state constitutional provisions and state statutes using 





  See Teachout, supra note 2, at 42. 
28
  See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS 
AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS 258–59 
(Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833) (reproducing Jan. 22, 1834 letter from the Secretary of State to the 
President explaining, in summary fashion, the history of the Jackson medal and how it came into the 
possession of the State Department) (link).  
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dwell on this evidence. These citations to post-bellum evidence, in my 
view, are almost entirely irrelevant to establishing the original public 




She also cites a Pennsylvania case from 1846 adjudicating a statute 
from 1839, tested under the Pennsylvania constitution of 1838.
30
 This is a 
half century after 1789. Teachout must explain why these state law 
materials discussing analogous state law language are probative or should 
be considered in light of competing federal materials from the 1790s.
 Like the presidential material which Teachout cites, the state law 
evidence she puts forward meets her burden of production. It is interesting, 
and it could be used to build a non-originalist argument for how we should 
interpret the Foreign Emoluments Clause, given who the American people 
are today and how the Republic has evolved. But many have been attracted 
to Teachout’s work because of her repeated claim that her research and 
analysis is connected both to 1787–1789 and to the Framers’ corruption-
obsessed worldview. So, these later materials, in my view, do not make her 
case.  
The South Carolina Statute of 1787. The South Carolina 
Incompatibility Act of 1787 states: “no officer heretofore elected, or 
hereafter to be elected, to any pecuniary office in this State . . . shall hold 
any other office of emolument under this or the United States.”
31
 She 
argues, as a matter of grammar, that it is reasonable to infer from the Act’s 
use of “other” that the “office[s] of emolument under this or the United 
States” are elected, just as is the initial “officer” described by the Act. From 
this Teachout reasons that “office . . . under this . . . [State]” and 
“office . . . under . . . the United States” are not attached strictly to 
appointed or statutory offices. If these terms reach elected offices, then the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause might embrace elected state and federal 
officials. Teachout’s argument might have bite if I had argued that office 
under the United States was universally understood as a matter of 
eighteenth-century legislative drafting. My position was and is that 
Office . . . under the United States and officers . . . of the United States are 
terms of art as used in the Constitution of 1787.
32





  Teachout, supra note 2, at 44 (citing State v. Buttz, 9 S.C. 156 (1877)); id. at 47 n.69 (discussing 
State ex rel. Rosenheim v. Hoyt, 2 Or. 246 (1867)); id. at 46 n.66 (discussing twentieth-century case 
law).  
30
  Id. at 45 (discussing Commonwealth ex rel. Owine v. Ford, 5 Pa. 67 (1846)).  
31
  See id. at 46 & n.67 (quoting Act No. 1368 of 1787, reprinted in 5 STAT. AT LARGE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 21 (T. Cooper ed., 1839)) (emphasis added).  
32
  Of course, I am not saying that the Framers acted on a clean slate. Usage similar to that embraced 
by the Federal Convention can be found elsewhere, including in prior British statutes. See Tillman, 
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statute preceded the Constitution of 1787. In these circumstances, the fact 
that its usage may be inconsistent with the Constitution is hardly surprising. 
Rather, it would be remarkable if it were precisely consistent at the level of 
detail Teachout is trying to impose.  
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. Teachout also cites Article II, 
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution of 1790,
33
 which she argues 
seems to distinguish offices under the United States from appointments 
under the United States.
34
 If the two are different, and not redundant, one 
might argue that one of the two categories embraces elected positions. In 
other words, one might conclude that office embraces elected positions 
because appointed positions are already accounted for. And it might follow 
that the similar Office language in the Foreign Emoluments Clause would 
also embrace elected positions. Teachout’s position comes without any 
extrinsic support and without fully considering alternatives and the 
implications of her own position. 
Both categories—offices under the United States and appointments 
under the United States—may refer exclusively to statutory officers. The 
difference may be one of timing: an appointment under the United States 
may refer to a person who has received his appointment, but has not taken 
his oath of office, at which time he holds an office under the United States. 
The distinction may be between those who take office by operation of law 
(i.e., succession) and so hold an office under the United States, and those 
who receive a presidential appointment, i.e., an appointment under the 
United States under the Appointments Clause. This interpretation is 
supported by the fact that this provision—in two places—distinguishes 
“holders” of office from those who merely “exercise” office.
35
  
More importantly, if Teachout is going to make this sort of fine 
grammatical argument, if the text of this provision distinguishes offices 
under the United States from appointments under the United States, then it 
would appear that this text also distinguishes members of Congress from 
office of trust or profit under the United States. If that is the case, then the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to congressional elections (and, 
by implication, to any state positions).  
The Blount Impeachment. Finally, the most significant early American 
material discussed by Teachout is the Blount case. In 1797, the House 
impeached Senator Blount. House managers brought articles of 
impeachment before the Senate and trial proceedings followed. In 1799, the 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 15, at 12 & nn.35–36 (2012) (citing ANNE TWOMEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES 438 (2004)).  
33
  PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8 (emphasis added) (link). 
34
  See Teachout, supra note 2, at 46–47. 
35
  PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8. 
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Senate dismissed the case.
36
 The modern consensus view—with some 
support in the ambiguous Senate materials—is that Blount stands for the 
proposition that members of Congress cannot be impeached. The problem 
with the consensus view is that even if one assumes (which is hardly clear) 
that the Senate dismissed the case because it determined that members of 
the legislature are not within the scope of the House’s impeachment power, 
one has equal reason to assume that the House brought its charges because 
it believed that members of Congress were within its scope. I think this is a 
fair conclusion, and I see no good reason to believe that the Senate is better 
authority than the House.  
Teachout takes this analysis one step further. The Impeachment Clause 
states: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction 
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”
37
 
Teachout’s position is that for the House to have impeached, its members 
must have believed that Senators were “Officers of the United States” 
within the scope of the Impeachment Clause, and if so, Senators are likely 
to be Officers . . . under the United States under the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause. The problem for Teachout is that the House records are almost as 
ambiguous as the Senate records. We know a majority of the House 
supported this impeachment, and we can presume they thought their actions 
constitutional. But we do not know why they thought it was constitutional. 
It is likely that some thought Senators were officers of the United States (at 
least for the purposes of the Impeachment Clause). But it is equally possible 
that the House members read the Impeachment Clause as an automatic 
removal provision, not a statement as to the scope of the House’s 
impeachment power.
38
 In other words, House members could support 






  See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2319 (1799) (recording Senate adoption of a resolution to the effect 
that: “this Court ought not to hold jurisdiction”) (link); 2 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 14, at 392 (recording Senate adoption of a resolution on July 8, 1797 to 
expel Blount) (link); 3 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 72–73 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1826) (recording July 7, 1797 resolution of the House to 
impeach Blount) (link). 
37
  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (link).  
38
  See TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
436 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 3d ed. rev. 1872) (“The general power of impeachment and trial may 
extend to others besides civil officers, as military or naval officers, or even persons not in office, and to 
other offences than those expressly requiring a judgment of removal from office . . . .”) (link); Charles 
Pergler, Note, Trial of Good Behavior of Federal Judges, 29 VA. L. REV. 876, 879 (1943) (“[W]e are 
dealing with a mandatory requirement, prescribing removal if a civil officer is impeached and convicted 
of the offenses . . . .”); see also Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial 
Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 66 & n.49, 98 & n.207 (1999) (link). 
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There is good reason to believe that the latter view played a significant 
role in the House’s Blount proceedings, even if some individual House 
members believed that members of Congress were officers of the United 
States. If one examines the House’s articles of impeachment, the document 
describes Senator Blount as having acted contrary to “his trust and station 
as a Senator,”
39
 not in the language of officer of the United States.
40
 If there 
had been widespread agreement in the House for the proposition that 
Senators were officers of the United States, one would think that that 
position would have been clearly voiced in the House’s articles of 
impeachment, just as any prosecutor would make clear jurisdictional 
allegations in his or her indictment.  
In fairness to Teachout, I must point out that a majority of (the handful 
of) Framers who spoke of the impeachability of Senators took Teachout’s 
position. For example, Edmund Randolph argued that the House’s 
impeachment power extended to senators.
41
 Apparently, Randolph thought 
the President was an officer of and under the United States and subject both 
to the Impeachment Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
42
 Among 
the Framers, the only exception seems to be James Monroe, who argued 
that members are not impeachable.
43
 None of the Framers, however, left us 
a clear reasoned basis for their views. Here and elsewhere, Teachout’s 
position has implications for constitutional law (e.g., the scope of the 
House’s impeachment power), quite apart from its First Amendment 
implications. Yet, Teachout fails to embrace the task of clarifying to the 
reader what aspects of public law will be destabilized by adopting her anti-
corruption principle.  
In short, Blount will remain an enigma. Teachout cannot rely on it to 
support her position that members of Congress are officers of the United 
States. It may very well have been the case that several House and Senate 
members believed that senators were officers of the United States and 
subject to impeachment. But we do not know why they (apart from some of 
the House managers who acted as prosecutors) believed it. Without 





  7 ANNALS OF CONG. 948–51 (1798) (reproducing Blount Articles of Impeachment) (link).  
40
  See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 app. (1864) (statement of Sen. Bayard) (explaining 
that the House’s articles of impeachment nowhere referred to Blount in the language of officer) (link).  
41
  See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 202 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES] (reproducing 
Randolph’s statement at the Virginia ratifying convention). 
42
  Id. at 485–86. 
43
  See JAMES MONROE, NOM DE PLUME A NATIVE OF VIRGINIA, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE 
PROPOSED PLAN OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Petersburg, Hunter & Prentis 1788), reprinted in 1 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 347, 361 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., N.Y.C., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 
1898) (link). 
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their (purported) view was a reasonable one, much less the best view of the 
Constitution’s text as a matter of original public meaning.  
III. TEACHOUT AND STATE OFFICIALS 
Teachout suggests that Office of Profit or Trust under them, the key 
language in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, arguably extends to state 
officials, including state elected officials.
44
 The Foreign Emoluments 
Clause is itself joined to the prior Titles of Nobility Clause, which states: 
 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: 
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under 
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of 
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind 




Teachout’s position has some grammatical support. In a federal system, 
under the federal entity language might be a term of art reaching the federal 
entity and its officials, or it might reach both the officials of the federal 
entity and its component states, provinces, and territories, and their 
officials.
46
 That said, her position is against the weight of the evidence; 
indeed, it is entirely idiosyncratic. She points to no persuasive authority 
suggesting that anyone ever embraced this point of view (until she did so in 
2009). 
A. The Text of the Articles of Confederation and the Text of the 
Constitution of 1787 
As a textual matter, the drafters of the Articles of Confederation were 
aware of this ambiguity. When they referred to the federal entity, the new 
national government, they used United States language,
47





  See Teachout, supra note 2, at 36–39. Teachout believes that my position relies on the fact that 
the Framers here chose “them” rather than “it” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Id. That is not my 
position. My position is simply that “them” relates back to the Titles of Nobility Clause’s prior use of 
“the United States.” As far as I know, the universal understanding of “the United States” (as expressly 
and implicitly used in this clause) is that it refers exclusively to federal, not state, positions. Teachout 
may be the first to argue otherwise.  
45
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
46
  See Luke Beck, The Constitutional Prohibition on Religious Tests, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 323, 352 
(2011) (“The root of the problem lies in the word ‘under’ [as in ‘under the Commonwealth of 
Australia’]. Does it mean ‘of’ such that the prohibition is limited to Commonwealth offices and public 
trusts? Or does it mean ‘within’ such that the prohibition applies to state offices and public trusts as 
well?”) (link).  
47
  See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XI (“Canada acceding to this 
Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to, 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/18/ 196 
referred to states they used States language,
48
 and when they meant both, 
they used express language accommodating both. The Articles did not rely 
on generic United States language or the word them when referring to the 
States as individual entities unless there was some specific referent or 
preposition which put the reader on express notice. To cite just a few 
examples:  
 
Article IV, Paragraph 1 discussing the “property of the 
United States, or either of them;”  
 
Article VI, Paragraph 1 precluding “the United States in 
Congress assembled, or any of them, grant[ing] any title of 
nobility;”  
 
Article VI, Paragraph 2 mandating that “[n]o two or more 
states shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance 




The drafters of the Constitution of 1787 followed similar (but not 
identical) drafting conventions. Where the Articles conflated national and 
state proscriptions into a single clause, the Constitution of 1787 created two 
clauses. For example:  
 
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8: “No title of nobility shall be 
granted by the United States;” and,  
 
Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1: “No State shall . . . grant 




Simply put, the drafters of the Constitution of 1787 did not rely on arguably 
ambiguous usage to embrace state officials.  
B. Scholarly and Judicial Authority on the Applicability of the 
Constitution’s Office-Laden Terminology to State Office 
It appears that the earliest scholarly authority to have examined 
whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause reaches state officials is Moore’s 
                                                                                                                           
all the advantages of this union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same unless such 
admission be agreed to by nine states.”).  
48
  See, e.g., id. at art. VI, para. 1 (“No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress 
assembled, shall send any embassy . . . .”). 
49
  Id. at art. IV, para. 1 (emphasis added); id. at art. VI, para. 1 (emphasis added); id. at art. VI, para. 
2 (emphasis added).  
50
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (link). 
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Digest, a source which Teachout relies on throughout her Northwestern 
University Law Review Colloquy essay. Moore’s states that the State 
Department, in 1872, took the position that state officials are outside the 
ambit of this clause.
51
 More recent commentators, such as Professor 
Rosenkranz, agree: federal constitutional provisions do not reach states or 
state officials by implication; only express language will do.
52
 
Teachout urges the reader to expand the reach of the Constitution’s 
arguably ambiguous Office language to include state office, in part, 
because:  
 
My own experience with politics suggests that complete 
awareness of grammar and its implications comes only 
when there are particularly highly interested parties (and 
there is no reason to think that there was an interested 
group of state officials who were aspiring to be foreign gift 
recipients), or debate, or a great deal more time and effort 




First, there is good early American, English, and other foreign authority 




More importantly, how much time is a “great deal” of time? The 
Framers took four full calendar months: from May 14, 1787 until 
September 17, 1787. To me, that seems like a “great deal” of time to adopt 
standard usage to be applied to the federal entity and coordinate standard 
usage to be applied to the States. And I too can refer to personal experience: 
draftsmen-lawyers are loath to repudiate extant language and settled 





  See 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651, at 577 (1906) (“The 
provisions of the Constitution ‘neither prevent nor authorize persons who may hold office under any one 
of the States from accepting an appointment under a foreign government.’” (quoting State Department 
correspondence from 1872)) (link).  
52
  See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1013 
(2011) (link).  
53
  Teachout, supra note 2, at 37 n.34.  
54
  See 2 DEBATES, supra note 41, at 449–50 (quoting James Wilson: “The great source of 
corruption, in that country, is, that persons may hold offices under the crown, and seats in the legislature 
at the same time.” (emphasis added)) (link); see also GERARD CARNEY, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT: 
LAW & ETHICS 67 (2000) (reporting judicial authority distinguishing office of profit “from the crown” 
from office of profit “under the crown” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); John 
Waugh, Disqualification of Members of Parliament in Victoria, 31 MONASH U. L. REV. 288, 297 (2005) 
(noting that English law distinguished “office of profit from the crown” from “office of profit under the 
crown” (internal quotation marks omitted)) (link); cf. Beck, supra note 46, at 351 (“[T]he Australian 
Constitution distinguishes between [officers] ‘of the Commonwealth’ and ‘under the Commonwealth’.” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
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have never heard any complaint in regard to its having left textually unclear 
which obligations applied to the states and which to the national 
government.  
And if Professor Rosenkranz (writing in the twenty-first century) and 
Professor Moore (writing in the twentieth century) seem insufficient, we 
can resolve the historical question by going back to a unanimous Supreme 
Court in Barron v. Baltimore,
55
 where Chief Justice Marshall, himself a 
ratifier, explained:  
 
If the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections 
of the first article [e.g., the Foreign Emoluments Clause], 
draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between 
the limitations it imposes on the powers of the general 
government, and on those of the state; if in every inhibition 
intended to act on state power, words are employed which 
directly express that intent; some strong reason must be 
assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course 
in framing the amendments, before that departure can be 
assumed.  




Of course, it is conceivable that Teachout is correct, as a matter of the 
original public meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, and Marshall 
was wrong (along with Hamilton and Washington). Teachout’s analysis is 
not defeated by the Supreme Court’s nineteenth-century ruling. Rather, the 
greater difficulty for Teachout is her inability to show that the voice of the 
nation—or any significant part thereof, or anyone at all—rose up to speak 
against this aspect of Marshall’s opinion.  
Teachout wants us to adopt her theory, not on the grounds that it is 
correct, but merely because she has shown that it is conceivable, i.e., 
grammatically Office . . . under the United States could reach state elected 
officials, including members of the state legislatures. But for the Marshall 
Court and those who came thereafter, this language has not been thusly 
understood. So it would seem that Teachout should not be able to rest her 
case on purported grammar-based ambiguity alone. All she has established 
is that her position is conceivable, not that it is the best understanding of the 





  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (link). 
56
  Id. at 249 (emphasis added).  
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C. Contemporaneous Practice 
Teachout has argued that the Office of Trust or Profit under the United 
States language in the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the President, 
members of Congress, and to state officials (apparently including members 
of the legislature and other elected state officials). The Incompatibility 
Clause uses similarly expansive Office language, stating: “[N]o Person 
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either 
House during his Continuance in Office.”
57
 If we apply Teachout’s 
premises, it would appear that the Incompatibility Clause precludes 
members of Congress from holding state positions—appointed or elected—
in any branch of state government.  
Teachout’s position is contradicted by The Federalist
58
 and scholarly 
authority.
59
 More importantly, the Incompatibility Clause did not bar 
Charles Carroll of Carrollton from simultaneously sitting in the Maryland 
senate and the United States Senate between 1789 and 1792.
60
 Apparently, 
he and his contemporaries did not believe that joint service was either 
barred by the federal Incompatibility Clause or by its state analogue.
61
  
Subsequently, Maryland amended its constitution to bar joint state–
federal legislative service.
62
 The proposed amendment passed the state 
legislature in 1791; it went into force in 1792.
63
 This state constitutional 
amendment, which was passed after the Constitution of 1787 was made 
public by the Federal Convention, followed the drafting conventions 





  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  
58
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 64 (James Madison) (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1998) 
(“The representatives of each state . . . will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at 
the very time be members of the state legislature . . . .” (emphasis added)) (link).  
59
  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers 
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1994) (“The Framers barred Members of 
Congress from holding federal executive or judicial offices, but the text they wrote allows joint office 
holding between: 1) the Executive and Judicial Departments, 2) the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, and 3) the federal government and the states.” (footnotes omitted)) (link); id. at 1050 (“Proposals 
to constitutionalize executive-judicial and federal-state incompatibility were made at the Constitutional 
Convention and were not approved.”). But see id. at 1047 (“[T]oday we largely understand the 
separation of powers to include a one person, one office codicil.” (emphasis added)). Teachout might 
latch on to that modern codicil, but that post-1789 view was not part of the corruption-obsessed world of 
the Framers.  
60
  JAN ONOFRIO, MARYLAND BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 116 (1999) (link).  
61
  Cf. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXVII (“[N]o person, who holds any office of profit in the gift of 
Congress, shall be eligible to sit in Congress; but if appointed to any such office, his seat shall be 
thereby vacated.”) (link).  
62
  See id. at art. LXXX (link). 
63
  Constitutional Amendments, ARCHIVES OF MD. ONLINE, 
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000380/html/am380p--1.html (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2013) (listing ratification dates of Maryland’s constitutional amendments) (link). 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/18/ 200 
from state positions; it distinguished offices under the United States from 
members of the legislature: 
 
That no member of congress, or person holding an office of 
trust or profit under the United States, shall be capable of 
having a seat in the general assembly [i.e., the state 
legislature], or being an elector of the [state] senate, or 




After this amendment went into effect, Charles Carroll resigned from 
Congress. He retained his state senate seat.
65
  
Charles Carroll was not alone. The First Congress had several 
members who concurrently held state legislative seats.
66
 Likewise, the First 
Congress had several members who concurrently held state executive and 
judicial office. For example, in 1790, Senator Philip John Schuyler, a U.S. 
senator, concurrently sat on the New York Council of Appointment.
67
  
In 1789, the Incompatibility Clause’s Office under the United States 
language did not bar members of Congress from holding state positions, 
elected or appointed. And that is good warrant for believing that the similar 
language in the Ineligibility Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause did 
not reach state officeholders. Of course, these three clauses are the primary 
constitutional provisions Teachout relies on. If these constitutional 
provisions do not extend to state office, then it seems reasonable to 
conclude that her anti-corruption principle—whatever its scope—cannot 





  MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LXXX (emphasis added). 
65
  ONOFRIO, supra note 60, at 116; 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1070 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter 19 
DHFFC] (noting Senator Charles Carroll of Carrollton (Md.) concurrently held a state senate seat).  
66
  See, e.g., 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 774–75 (William C. di Giacomantonio et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter 14 DHFFC] (noting 
Congressman Clymer (Pa.) was a member of the state assembly); id. at 706 (noting Senator Schuyler 
(N.Y.) concurrently held a state senate seat); 19 DHFFC, supra note 65, at 1070 (noting Congressman 
Fitzsimons (Pa.) was a member of the state legislature); id. at 1070 (noting Congressman Huntington 
(Conn.) was a member of the state legislative council). But cf. id. at 1069 (noting that the New York 
state senate declared Congressman Hathorn, Congressman Laurance, and Senator Schuyler’s state senate 
seats vacant, and that the New York state house declared Senator King’s state house seat vacant); id. 
at 1070–82 (collecting primary documents suggesting that the New York legislative houses acted under 
state constitutional law). There is no example of a house of the First Federal Congress (or a 
contemporaneous court, federal or state) declaring joint federal–state legislative service incompatible 
under the Incompatibility Clause or under the authority of the U.S. Constitution.  
67
  See 14 DHFFC, supra note 66, at 706, 709 (discussing Schuyler); id. at 842 (noting Congressman 
Burke (S.C.) was a state court judge, “on leave of absence without [judicial] pay during his 
[c]ongressional term”); id. at 630–31 (noting Congressman Leonard (Mass.) was a judge on the state 
Court of Common Pleas); 19 DHFFC, supra note 65, at 1069 (same); id. at 1069 (noting Congressman 
Partridge (Mass.) was a county sheriff).  
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D. Teachout and The Framers’ Corruption-Speak 
Can Teachout make the argument that, apart from the constitutional 
text, the more nebulous corruption-speak or worldview of the Framers and 
ratifiers is a sufficient basis for expanding the scope of the federal anti-
corruption principle to state office? That is an interesting question. My own 
view is “no.” The expectations, hopes, aspirations, intent, and worldview of 
the founders cannot be imposed as “law,” much less constitutional law, if 
those mental states were not meaningfully embodied in the formal 
constitutional text. If the Framers wanted the primary anti-corruption 
provisions in the Constitution to reach state officials, they had ready 
language at their fingertips to achieve that end. But they did not make use 
of any such language. The better view is that the absence of such language 
is some indication that the era of the Framers lacked strong or meaningful 
consensus in regard to extending the anti-corruption principle beyond zones 
expressly embraced by the constitutional text and circumstances about 
which the Framers had first-hand experience during the colonial period and 
under the Articles.  
But even if I am wrong about this interpretive question, Teachout’s 
2009 article was understood as an interpretation of the Constitution’s text, 
not as a meta-historical period study. For example, Justice Stevens, in his 
Citizens United dissent, cited Teachout immediately before and after citing 
to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
68
 Why? Because he (and everyone else, 
except perhaps Teachout herself) understood her 2009 article to be an 
interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and related constitutional 
provisions. The original public meaning of Teachout’s prior scholarship 
was that she was interpreting the Constitution’s text through the prism of 
corruption-speak. If now she takes the position that the anti-corruption 
principle is supported only by the Founders’ general intent or purposes or 
expectations, then it is unlikely that many who originally embraced her 
position will remain supporters.  
E. Does It Matter if the Foreign Emoluments Clause Extends to State 
Offices? 
Teachout argues in the alternative that the anti-corruption principle 
remains viable even if the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach state 
positions: 
 
In short, even if states were intentionally excluded, [this] 





  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51, 963–64 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (link). 
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state officials to accept foreign gifts when representing the 
country, simply because they cannot represent the country. 
Without this intention, even if the “Constitution of 1787 
liberalized the foreign government gift-giving regime in 
regard to state offices,” this liberalization does not reflect a 




Teachout’s historical claim seems dubious. State government and state 
officials could use their powers (rightly or wrongly) to check the federal 
government and its policies. That is virtually the whole of the fabric of 
American history from the Articles of Confederation to 1787–1789, and 
then until the Civil War (and some might say into Reconstruction and the 
Civil Rights Movement and beyond). Is it really controversial to affirm that 
the Framers were aware that the national government being established was 
(much like its predecessor) dependent on the goodwill of state government 
and state officials? For example, President George Washington consistently 
sought the aid of state governors. He did so during the Whiskey Rebellion 
and he asked for assistance in enforcing his Neutrality Proclamation.
70
  
Again, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, state governors could fill 
Senate vacancies with temporary appointees.
71
 If a foreign power bribed a 
state governor, the foreign policy implications—for war, peace, and treaty-
making—are plain, notwithstanding that the governor is not conducting 
“foreign policy.” 
So, contrary to Teachout, even if a state official was not conducting 
“foreign policy” per se, a foreign power’s bribing such a state official could 
have serious implications for the peace of the Republic. And such disloyalty 
was not beyond the Framers’ imagination: Benedict Arnold, Ethan Allen,
72
 
Blount, and Burr. Today, the foundations of the Republic seem so secure, 
and these men occupy only footnotes in our history. But, it was not always 
so. There was a time when these men and others like them threatened the 
existence of our country.  
If one concedes that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach 
state office, then it seems unreasonable to assert either that the world of the 
Framers was corruption-obsessed or that the scope of Teachout’s anti-
corruption principle reaches state officials. In 1787, corruption played its 





  Teachout, supra note 2, at 37–38 (quoting Tillman) (footnote omitted). 
70
  See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 49 (2008). 
71
  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (link). 
72
  See Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past Historical Fact and Fiction: A Response to 
Professor Geoffrey R. Stone’s Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture and Essay, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 
391, 403 & n.29 (2009) (discussing Ethan Allen) (link).  
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sometimes trumped corruption concerns.
73
 Article VI of the Articles of 
Confederation reached state officers; its successor, the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, does not. To me, at least, this seems clear.  
What might have motivated the Framers to exempt state officials from 
the reach of the Foreign Emoluments Clause? I frankly admit that I do not 
know. Perhaps it was nothing more than the simple prudential concern of 
getting the state legislatures to call state conventions to ratify the proposed 
federal constitution. Federal monitoring of state officials, per an Articles of 
Confederation Article VI analogue, may have been perceived—by both 
state officials and the public—as a source of friction and discord. It is one 
thing to put state officials under the thumb of independent U.S. Constitution 
Article III courts; it is quite another to put them under the thumb of 
Congress. A Foreign Emoluments Clause extending only to some federal 
positions risked some corruption at the state level, but it may have made the 
possibility of ratification all the more likely.  
Why did the Framers exempt federal elected officials from the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause? Again, I frankly admit that I do not know. Perhaps 
because they left the issue to future congressional rulemaking (for 
members) and to statutes (for members and other elected government 
positions)? Perhaps because they relied on both disclosure (i.e., Washington 
putting the key to the Bastille and the Louis XVI portrait on display) and 
elections? In other words, they relied on elected officials to act like 
fiduciaries. That is one answer.  
Still, I think the answer may be somewhat simpler. It is not uncommon 
to treat those at the apex of authority somewhat differently from others—
even to exempt them from burdens which apply to others. Sometimes this is 
a reflection of insiders protecting their own. But, it is also frequently a 
reflection of deep wisdom: the kind that comes with practical experience in 
the world and its affairs. For example, the federal Code of Judicial Conduct 
applies to all Article III judges—except members of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. Is that because Supreme Court justices do not need 
ethics? No. Is it because they are better human beings, citizens, and jurists 
than their lower court colleagues? No. Consider recusal when judicial bias 
is asserted. Each justice must decide to recuse on his or her own. If an 
appeal to the full Court were permitted, then the minority’s ability to 
exercise the judicial power of the United States would exist only at the 
sufferance of the majority. If an appeal were permitted to non-members, 
then you will have effectively transferred responsibility from the Supreme 





  See supra note 7 (quoting the Incompatibility Clause of the Articles of Confederation and of the 
Constitution of 1787). 
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George Washington was not subject to the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause. When receiving a gift from a foreign government, his behavior was 
public and transparent. Secretary of State Jefferson
74
 was subject to the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, and he acted in secret. Perhaps the final 
language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause reflects the victory of 
transparency concerns over corruption fears, at least when it comes to 
elected officials at the apex of political responsibility.  
IV. TEACHOUT’S ORIGINALISM: ORIGINAL INTENT OR ORIGINAL PUBLIC 
MEANING? 
As explained, Article VI of the Articles of Confederation flatly 
prohibited officers under the United States and officers under any state from 
accepting foreign government gifts. The Constitution of 1787’s Foreign 
Emoluments Clause expressly permitted federal officers to accept such gifts 
if Congress consented.  
I concluded that the “modern” clause represents a “reform and a 
significant relaxation [from] the strictures of the older clause.”
75
 Teachout 
has argued that I have “misread” the clause and that the new language 
represents a codification of “the accepted interpretation of what the [Article 
VI provision] required previously.”
76
 She points to two occasions, after the 
Articles went into force in 1781, where the Articles Congress approved 
officers’ receiving such gifts. On March 3, 1786, the Articles Congress 
permitted John Jay to accept a horse from the King of Spain and also 
permitted Franklin to accept a jewel-studded snuffbox from Louis XVI.
77
  
I have doubts that these two decisions taken by the Articles Congress 
on a single day establish the “accepted interpretation” of Article VI. It is 
possible that the Articles Congress erred or simply believed it had the 
power to set the provision aside under a unanimity rule.
78





  Teachout recounts the story of how Louis XVI gave an expensive gift to Thomas Jefferson, the 
former United States minister to France, and the then current Secretary of State under President 
Washington. Jefferson’s conduct was secretive; he used intermediaries; he actively hid his behavior 
from public and congressional scrutiny; he had the gift destroyed. He did so because he knew the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to his conduct, even if as a matter of diplomatic necessity he 
(arguably) had grounds not to comply. See Teachout, supra note 2, 38–39. Washington’s conduct was 
completely different. Upon receiving the gift, he immediately sent a letter in writing thanking the French 
ambassador. And, afterwards, he put the portrait on display in his anteroom. See supra Part II.B. 
75
  Tillman, supra note 15, at 5.  
76
  Teachout, supra note 2, at 36. But cf. Davis, supra note 26, at 381 (explaining that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause “negated and superseded” the confederation-era practice).  
77
  See 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 95 (1934) (link).  
78
  This is not a stretch. Consider: the Articles of Confederation expressly demanded unanimous 
consent of the States to substantively modify the Articles. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. 
XIII. Yet, based on a mere unanimous vote of the Articles Congress, the Articles Congress sent the 
Constitution of 1787 to the States for ratification. But, the Constitution of 1787 was to go into effect 
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matter. Our task here is not to discover what the Articles Congress thought 
was the public meaning of Article VI in 1781 (when the Articles came into 
effect). Such evidence, at best, goes to the original intent of the Framers in 
1787. Rather, our task is to understand what the American public thought 
the meaning of Article VI was between 1787 and 1790, the time period 
during which the original thirteen states ratified the Constitution, and, 
concomitantly, if the public thought that meaning was different from its 
successor: the Foreign Emoluments Clause in the Constitution of 1787.  
And what did the public think?  
As explained, the Foreign Emoluments Clause states: “[N]o Person 
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent 
of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any 
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”
79
 Between 1788 
and 1790, four state ratifying conventions independently sought to strip out 
the italicized language.
80
 In other words, with regard to the specific issue of 
congressional authorization, they were attempting to bring the language of 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause back to the extant language in Article VI. 
What possible reason could they have had except for the fact that the 
people, during ratification, thought Article VI’s language was mandatory, 
and not subject to congressional waiver? Why else would these four state 
conventions, and later members of the House and Senate in the First 
Congress proposing constitutional amendments,
81
 have sought such a 
change? In short, the Foreign Emoluments Clause represented—in the 
minds of (some of) the people—a relaxation of the strictures imposed by its 
Article VI predecessor.  
These people opposed that relaxation: they wanted the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause to be as demanding as its Article VI predecessor. They 
did not get the constitutional amendment they sought. But, they did give us 
a good idea of what was the original public meaning of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause and its Article VI predecessor (as understood during 
ratification). 
                                                                                                                           
when as few as nine states—not thirteen states—ratified the new instrument of government. See U.S. 
CONST. art. VII (link).  
79
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
80
  See 1 DEBATES, supra note 41, at 331 (New York ratifying convention proposing a constitutional 
amendment expressly “expung[ing]” the Foreign Emolument Clause’s “consent” language); id. at 336 
(Rhode Island ratifying convention doing the same); see also id. at 323 (Massachusetts ratifying 
convention proposing a free-standing amendment denying Congress the power to consent); id. at 326 
(New Hampshire ratifying convention doing the same).  
81
  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 761–62 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (Representative Tucker seeking 
to amend the Constitution by “[s]trik[ing] out the words ‘[w]ithout the consent of Congress’”); see also 
id. at 778 (Representative Gerry proposing a free-standing amendment denying Congress the power to 
consent).  
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The Foreign Emoluments Clause was firmly rooted in corruption 
concerns, but the public meaning of the text of the clause shows that other 
concerns trumped corruption. Teachout puts forward a maximalist 
interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Constitution’s 
Office language: she argues that this clause extends to state officials and to 
all elected federal ones. Likewise, she argues that the change in language 
from the Articles to the Constitution did not effect a substantive change. 
This is not surprising. Once one accepts any of these textual and historical 
limitations on the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, one can no 
longer embrace a formless, seamless, free-standing anti-corruption 
principle. At most, one will have a textually limited anti-corruption 
principle: where the scope of each constitutional provision is limited to the 
particular wrongs that were known to the Framers or to the particular 
wrongs reached by each provision’s text. In that situation, the anti-
corruption principle would have very little independent bite, much less the 
ability to compete with the First Amendment (i.e., to authorize Congress to 
regulate federal election processes).  
V. TEACHOUT AND CORRUPTION 
Teachout and I disagree whether the Constitution’s primary anti-
corruption provisions reach state and federal elected officials. If they do, 
then Teachout’s domestic-corporation-as-foreign-government analogy has 
weight, and her anti-corruption principle has independent bite which, 
potentially, could compete against the First Amendment. But, if the Office 
language of those provisions—the object of these provisions—does not 
reach elected office, then a reasonable person might also conclude that our 
inquiry is over. The anti-corruption principle cannot overcome the textual 
limitations which inhere in the very constitutional provisions giving rise to 
the principle. 
Teachout does not agree. Rather, she argues that even if the text does 
not directly reach elected positions, the principle reaches them—“directly” 
and “explicitly.”
82
 But how can any principle which arises by inference 
work “explicitly”? What does she mean?  
I think I know.  
For Teachout, the Constitution is not the text; it does not even start 
with the text. The real Constitution—the anti-corruption Constitution—is 
the great background consensus: the anti-corruption worldview which 
formed the prism through which all other ideas and ideals passed.  
Teachout never expressly develops any normative framework which 





  Teachout, supra note 2, at 51.  
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worldview into “law.” So let’s talk about that. If such a normative 
framework exists, what would it look like?  
I suppose it would have to be a consent-based theory. There is no 
contradiction here. To the extent our “soft” originalist inquiry is text-
engaged, we can inform our textual understanding based on the public’s 
worldview—and yes, the Framers are part of that public. There is no moral 
imperative that anyone consented to that worldview for the purpose of 
understanding the text because the text itself carries sufficient indicia of 
public consent.  
But if the worldview itself is set up as creating independent 
constitutional norms untethered to the Constitution’s text, then that 
worldview must be one that the public engaged and chose. Teachout writes 
that “Tillman wants to drag me into a debate about the various uses of the 
word ‘office[]’ in the Constitution . . . .”
83
 That’s not quite right, although 
perhaps I have not been as clear as I could have been. The language of 
office and officer was coextensive with the language of corruption in the 
minds of our eighteenth-century forbears. A person holding an office was a 





 and good faith
86
: the very duties private law still imposes on 
trustees, directors, executors, and other agents. But a conflicted or faithless 
officeholder would be described as corrupt, or, if holding a public office, as 
corrupt and/or tyrannical.
87
 This was the eighteenth century’s vocabulary or 
discourse of office. The Framers did not choose it; they inherited it from the 
English yeomanry, the Whigs, and from the constitutional settlement arising 
out of the ashes of the two English civil wars. Teachout emphasizes that the 
Framers’ discussion of corruption bleeds across the pages of the 
Philadelphia Convention’s record. It would have been surprising if it did 






  Teachout, supra note 2, at 39.  
84
  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause) (“[The President] shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .” (emphasis added)) (link); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and 
the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1142–45 (2004) (discussing the duty of care as applicable to 
holders of public office) (link).  
85
  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (Oaths and Affirmations Clause) (link); Natelson, supra 
note 84, at 1146–50 (discussing duty of loyalty as applicable to holders of public office).  
86
  See, e.g., supra note 84 (quoting Take Care Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he 
enter on the Execution of his Office, [the President] shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do 
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and 
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’” 
(emphasis added)) (link).  
87
  See, e.g., CONAL CONDREN, ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 94–95 
(2006); Conal Condren, Public, Private and the Idea of the ‘Public Sphere’ in Early–Modern England, 
19 INTELL. HIST. REV. 15, 26 (2009). 
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I think Teachout is correct: corruption-speak dominated the worldview 
of the Framers, and of the ratifiers, and of the public of 1787–1789 (and of 
our people for a long time thereafter). But if corruption-speak was the only 
prism through which they could understand and communicate about the 
language of office and officer—if it was not a discourse they consented to, 
not one they actively chose, but a linguistic necessity which chose them
88
—
then I do not see how Teachout’s anti-corruption principle, standing apart 







  EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 144 (London, J. Dodsley 1790) 
(“It is the first and supreme necessity only, a necessity that is not chosen but chooses, a necessity 
paramount to deliberation, that admits no discussion, and demands no evidence, which alone can justify 
a resort to anarchy.” (emphasis added)) (link). 
